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Why Do Countries Matter so Much in Corporate Social Performance? 
Abstract 
Why do levels of corporate social performance (CSP) differ so much across countries? We 
answer this question in an examination of CSP ratings of more than 2,600 companies from 36 
countries. We find that firm characteristics explain very little of the variations in CSP ratings. In 
contrast, variations in country factors such as stages of economic development, culture, and 
institutions account for a significant proportion of variations in CSP ratings across countries. In 
particular, we find that CSP ratings are high in countries with high income-per-capita, strong 
civil liberties and political rights, and cultures oriented toward harmony and autonomy. 
Furthermore, we find that home country factors explain a smaller portion of the overall 
variations in CSP for multinationals and cross-listed firms than for non-multinationals and pure 
domestic firms, respectively. 
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1. Introduction 
Why do levels of corporate social performance (CSP) differ so much across firms in 
different countries? This is the central question in our paper. We examine CSP ratings in a 
sample of more than 2,600 companies from 36 countries in the MSCI ESG Intangible Value 
Assessment (IVA) database. We find that country factors are much more important than firm 
characteristics in explaining the variations in CSP ratings. To the best of our knowledge, our 
paper is the first to show the relative importance of firm characteristics and country factors in 
CSP ratings.  
Differences in median CSP ratings of companies across countries are striking. The 
median CSP rating of Finnish companies is 5 on a scale ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 7. In 
contrast, the median CSP rating of Chinese companies is 2. Why do countries matter so much for 
CSP ratings? We find that differences in stages of economic development explain some of the 
differences in median CSP ratings. Firms in developed countries, such as Finland, have higher 
CSP ratings than those from emerging countries, such as China. The median CSP rating among 
developed countries is 4, significantly higher than the median of 3 among emerging countries. 
However, differences in economic development do not account for all the differences in CSP 
ratings. For example, the median CSP rating of companies in Germany, France, and the U.K. is 5, 
whereas the median is only 3 in the U.S., Hong Kong, and Ireland. We observe considerable 
variations in CSP among emerging countries as well. The median CSP rating in Brazil and South 
Africa is 5, whereas it is 2 in Israel, Mexico and Turkey.  
We find that country factors beyond economic development, such as institutions and 
culture, play important roles in explaining differences in CSP ratings among countries. In 
particular, we find that CSP ratings are high in countries whose laws encourage competition, 
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countries with strong civil liberties and political rights, and cultures oriented toward harmony 
and autonomy.  
Social norms offer one example of institutions and the pressures they exert. American 
social norms frown on ‘sin’ companies associated with alcohol, tobacco, and gaming, and on the 
broader set of ‘shunned’ companies that also includes those associated with weapons, military 
hardware and nuclear operations. These social norms are reflected in the ‘negative screens’ of 
American socially responsible mutual funds that exclude stocks of sin and shunned companies. 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find that norm-constrained American institutions, such as public 
pension plans, invest significantly less in sin stocks than conventional mutual funds and hedge 
funds that are less constrained. 
Culture also influences financial choices that affect CSP. Guiso et al. (2008) define 
culture as “those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit 
fairly unchanged from generation to generation.” People from the same culture share beliefs and 
values that influence their financial choices. Stulz and Williamson (2003) argue that culture 
influences financial choices because culture determines the values that are predominant in a 
country, influencing its institutions and resource allocation. Ahern et al. (2012) find fewer cross-
border mergers between countries that are more culturally distant. Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) 
find that borrowers receive smaller loans at higher interest rates from culturally distant lead 
banks than from culturally close lead banks. Moreover, culturally distant lead banks are more 
likely to require third-party guarantees.  
Globalization could reduce the importance of country factors for CSP by providing firms 
with access to financial markets and institutions of other countries. U.S. institutions affect 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) levels of non-U.S. firms that cross-list in the U.S. markets. 
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Boubakri et al (2016) find that CSR increases after cross-listing in U.S. markets, and decreases 
after delisting from U.S. markets. El Ghoul et al. (2016) show that CSR is more positively 
related to firm value in countries with weaker market institutions. We find that in our sample, 
country dummies explain a smaller portion of the overall variations in CSP for multinationals 
and cross-listed firms than for non-multinationals and pure domestic firms, respectively.  
Our study contributes to the fast growing literature on corporate social performance, 
especially studies that explore the determinants of CSP ratings (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001; Campbell, 2007). It is also related to Ioannou and Serafeim’s (2012) but is different in two 
important ways. First, Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) examine the impact of country institutions 
on CSP, using firm characteristics as controls. They do not examine the relative importance of 
country factors and firm characteristics in determining CSP, which is an important part of our 
study. Our paper complements theirs by offering evidence on the relative importance of country 
factors and firm characteristics in determining the levels of CSP.  
Second, we argue that stages of economic development play an important role in 
explaining variations in country CSP, and find a very strong association between countries’ CSP 
ratings and their stages of economic development, measured by income-per-capita. Indeed, many 
country factors such as the cultural dimensions of individualism and power distance, the political 
characteristics of corruption and competition, and the education and labor system characteristics 
of union density and availability of skilled labor are highly correlated with stages of economic 
development. We follow Djankov et al. (2008) in controlling for income-per-capita when 
analyzing the association of institutional and culture factors with CSP. Ioannou and Serafeim 
(2012) exclude stages of economic development from their analysis based on a study by Chapple 
and Moon (2005) who “find that cross-county CSP variation cannot be explained by the stage of 
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economic development.” Chapple and Moon (2005), however, include only 50 companies in 
seven Asian countries, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore and 
Thailand. All, with the exception of Singapore, are emerging countries, presenting too little 
variability in levels of economic development to provide reliable association between economic 
development and CSP. 
Our study is also related to Doidge et al.’s (2007) study of corporate governance across 
countries. They find that country factors explain much more of the variance in corporate 
governance than firm characteristics. Similarly, we find that variations in company 
characteristics such as ratios of R&D expenditures to sales, ratios of market value to book value, 
and rates of return on assets explain little of the variations in CSP ratings across companies in 
different countries. Instead, variations in country factors including culture, institutions, and 
levels of economic development, explain much of variations in CSP ratings. Corporate 
governance is one aspect of our overall CSP measure, and we show that our results hold for 
corporate governance as well as for other aspects of CSP that are not related to corporate 
governance.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we discuss companies’ choice of CSP 
levels. In section 3, we develop testable hypotheses. We describe our sample in section 4 and 
summarize the empirical results in section 5. Section 6 provides additional robustness checks, 
and section 7 concludes.   
 
2. Companies’ choice of CSP levels 
Corporate managers balance the benefits and costs as they choose CSP levels. These 
benefits and costs vary from country to country such as by culture, institutions, and stages of 
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economic development. Campbell (2007) argues that institutional factors can either enhance CSP 
or inhibit it. These factors include public and private regulations, non-governmental and other 
independent organizations that monitor corporate actions, institutionalized norms of appropriate 
corporate behavior, associations among corporations, and organized dialogues among 
corporations and their stakeholders. Country factors matter because they affect the costs of 
investing in CSP as well as the benefits firms derive from such investments. Campbell (2007) 
writes that “corporations will be more likely to act in socially responsible ways if there are strong 
and well-enforced state regulations in place to ensure such behavior.” 
Inducements and constraints on CSP vary from country to country, and investments that 
increase CSP vary with them. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) note that German automakers 
Daimler and BMW maintain considerably higher CSP levels than Japanese automakers Daihatsu 
and Kawasaki. The median CSP rating of German companies in our sample is 5, whereas that of 
Japanese companies is 4. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) attribute the difference in CSP levels to 
differences between Germany and Japan in politics, labor and education, and financial and 
cultural institutions. For example, Japanese laws and regulations promote competition among 
companies more than German laws and regulations, constraining the profit margins of Japanese 
companies and limiting their ability to undertake investments that enhance CSP. Corruption is 
higher in Japan than in Germany, reducing pressure on Japanese companies to undertake 
investments that enhance CSP.  
Low cost of capital enhances corporate financial performance and motivates companies 
to undertake investments. Investments in CSP can enhance corporate financial performance if 
they lower companies’ cost of capital. Consistent with this idea, El Ghoul et al. (2011) find that 
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U.S. companies with low CSP ratings such as those in the tobacco and nuclear power industries 
are burdened by high cost of capital.  
 Differences in cost of capital are related to differences in risk. Oikonomou et al. (2012) 
find that high CSP ratings are associated with low systematic risk, and this negative relation is 
especially strong among companies at the low end of CSP. Bouslah et al. (2013) find that risk is 
high when concerns are raised about companies’ employee relations, diversity, and corporate 
governance.  Goss and Roberts (2011) find that companies with greater CSP concerns pay 7–18 
basis points more for loans than other companies. Humphrey et al. (2012), however, find no 
difference between the risk-adjusted financial performance of U.K. companies with high CSP 
and low CSP ratings, and no difference in their levels of unsystematic risk.   
 There is mixed evidence on the association between CSP and corporate financial 
performance. Russo and Fouts (1997) and Guenster et al. (2011) find that high CSP is associated 
with better corporate financial performance. A few recent studies offer similar evidence. For 
example, Cheng et al. (2014) find that better stakeholder engagement and transparency reduce 
capital constraints. Moreover, companies with higher CSP face significantly lower capital 
constraints. Eccles et al. (2014) find that corporations that voluntarily adopted sustainability 
policies exhibit distinct organizational processes and have better accounting performance and 
stock returns. Flammer (2015) examines CSP proposals that pass or fail by small vote margins, 
and finds that adoption of such proposals leads to positive announcement returns and superior 
accounting performance.   
There are, however, both theoretical rationales and empirical evidence indicating that 
increased CSP does not increase corporate financial performance without limit. Otherwise, we 
would have seen all companies undertake investments that enhance CSP without limit. Increases 
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in CSP beyond some optimal level degrade corporate financial performance rather than enhance 
it. Managers aiming to maximize the value of their companies invest in projects that enhance 
CSP to a level where the marginal benefits equal marginal costs. Kim and Statman (2012) find 
that corporate financial performance increases with CSP up to a point but diminishes beyond that 
point, consistent with the view that managers increase CSP when it enhances corporate financial 
performance but decrease it when it diminishes corporate financial performance. Specifically 
they find that increases in CSP ratings are followed by increases in earnings and valuations, yet 
decreases in CSP ratings are also followed by increases in earnings and valuations, consistent 
with the hypothesis that managers adjust CSP ratings up or down to maximize earnings and 
valuations. 
Further evidence comes from Hong et al. (2012) who show that companies increase CSP 
levels only when they do well in the sense of having financial slack. Hong et al. (2012) model 
companies’ optimal CSP-enhancing investments in the presence of financial constraints, and find 
that less-constrained companies engage in more CSP-enhancing investments. Using the Internet 
bubble of 1996-2000 as a quasi-experiment, they establish that causality goes from financial 
constraints to CSP levels. Moreover, they find that CSP is more sensitive to financial constraints 
than capital expenditure or R&D spending.  
To better understand how country factors may affect firms’ choice of CSP investment, we 
present a simple model to illustrate the tradeoffs firms face. We consider a model of a firm 
searching for the optimal level of investment in CSP, the level that maximizes its value. It is a 
one-period model in which the firm maximizes valuation by maximizing net profit during the 
period. 1 
                                                            
1 For simplicity, we assume a zero discount rate. A different discount rate will scale the profit function by a constant, 
leaving the analysis unchanged. 
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The company has an investment opportunity that requires a capital investment, K, and an 
investment in corporate social performance, CSP. The company’s output is governed by its 
production function, f(K, aCSP), where f(K, aCSP) is a neoclassical production function with 
஼݂ௌ௉ᇱ ൐ 0, ஼݂ௌ௉ᇱᇱ ൏ 0. The parameter a captures the benefit firms derive from investing in CSP on 
the production output and it varies across countries. For example, the value people associate with 
clean environment and safe working conditions is lower in countries where people are struggling 
to meet the basic needs for food and shelter. Therefore, a is low in countries with low economic 
development. 
Companies can either choose to invest in CSP to the level necessary to meet regulatory 
standards, denoted as  ܥܵܲതതതതത, or invest less than that level by circumventing regulatory standards, 
such as lobbying or outright bribery. Therefore the total cost of CSP investment has two 
components: the direct cost of investing in CSP (ܥܵܲ) and the cost of circumventing CSP 
ሺ0.5ܾሺܥܵܲതതതതത െ ܥܵܲሻଶሻ. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the unit cost of CSP investment 
is one dollar, and that ܥܵܲതതതതത	is the same in all countries. The parameter b captures the cost of 
circumvention per unit of CSP, and 0b  . The magnitude of b depends on country factors such 
as economic development, corruption, civil liberties and political rights, and cultural norms. For 
example, the cost of bribery is lower in countries with high corruption than in countries with low 
corruption, therefore b is low in countries with high corruption. 
The firm chooses the level of CSP to maximize the following net profit function: 
      ߎ ൌ ݂ሺܭ, ܽܥܵܲሻ െ ܭ െ ሾܥܵܲ ൅ 0.5ܾሺܥܵܲതതതതത െ ܥܵܲሻଶሿ        (1) 
Taking the first-order condition, we can derive the optimal level of CSP, denoted by 
CSP*, as: 
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                                 ܥܵܲ∗ 	ൌ ܥܵܲതതതതത െ ଵ௕ ሺ1 െ ݂ܽ஼ௌ௉∗ᇱ ሻ                                                  
(2) 
where ଵ௕ ሺ1 െ ܽ ஼݂ௌ௉∗ᇱ ሻ is the optimal amount of CSP circumvented, which depends both on the 
benefit of improving CSP and the cost of circumventing CSP. 
 Taking the derivative of equation (2) with respect to a and b respectively, and we get  
                                                        డ஼ௌோ
∗
డ௔ ൌ 	
ଵ
௕ ஼݂ௌ௉∗
ᇱ                                                   (3) 
                                                        డ஼ௌோ
∗
డ௕ ൌ 	
ଵ
௕మ ሺ1 െ ܽ ஼݂ௌ௉∗ᇱ ሻ                                      (4) 
Therefore we have డ஼ௌ௉
∗
డ௔ ൒ 0 and 
డ஼ௌ௉∗
డ௕ ൒ 0.2 This leads to the prediction that ܥܵܲ∗	increases 
with a and b, suggesting that the optimal level of CSP is relatively high in countries where the 
benefit of investing in CSP is high and the cost of circumvention is high.  
 
3. Hypotheses 
In this section, we discuss how country factors such as economic development, political 
systems, and culture affect the costs and benefits of investments in CSP and develop testable 
hypotheses.  
3.1 Economic development  
Consider a hierarchy of human needs. Basic needs, such as food and shelter, precede 
higher needs, such as clean air and water. Seale et al. (2003) find that people in low-income 
countries spend a greater proportion of income on basics such as food than those in high-income 
countries. This difference does not occur because the desires of people in low-income countries 
to satisfy upper needs are lower than in high-income countries, but because the resources 
                                                            
2 It is reasonable to assume that 	a ஼݂ௌ௉ᇱ ൑ 1 as value-maximizing companies would not invest in CSP to a level 
where the marginal benefits  ሺܽ ஼݂ௌ௉ᇱ ሻ exceeds the marginal cost, which is 1 by assumption. 
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available to satisfy upper needs in low-income countries are lower than that in developed 
countries.  
CSP metrics capture mostly upper needs, such as clean environment, safe working 
conditions, and absence of child labor. Resources for such needs are limited in countries with 
lower levels of economic development. Zheng et al. (2011) find that the demand for clean air in 
China increased with income. Prices of houses are high in Chinese cities where ambient 
pollution levels are low. Finney et al. (2011) find that higher incomes lead people to migrate to 
areas of higher air quality, exacerbating segregation by income. This leads to our hypothesis on 
economic development: 
Hypothesis 1: CSP is high in countries where the level of economic development is high. 
3.2 Political systems  
 We examine two factors associated with the political systems of a country – corruption, 
and civil liberty and political rights. These factors determines the cost of circumvention CSP in a 
country, therefore play an important role in firms’ decisions on circumventing the regulatory 
CSP standards through activities such as lobbying or outright bribery. 
3.2.1. Corruption: 
According to Transparency International, corruption is "the misuse of public power for 
private benefit.”  Corruption can take on many forms, ranging from companies making political 
contributions to outright bribery.  Politicians and donors routinely deny links between 
contributions and legislative benefits, yet links exist. The Wall Street Journal (2001) quotes 
James Harless, a board member of Massey Energy, a coal mining company, saying: “We were 
looking for friends and we found one in George W. Bush.” Paybacks (2002), a report by Earth-
justice and Public Campaign, states that Harless and his family contributed $60,650 to the 
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Republican National Campaign and the Bush 2000 campaign since 1999.3 According to the 
report, payback to the mining industry included “eliminating environmental protections to allow 
coal and hardrock mining companies to use rivers, streams, wetlands, and other waters as waste 
dumps and threaten communities and the environment with new dangerous mines”. 
Existing research offer much empirical evidence that corporate benefits from political 
connections. Cooper et al. (2010) find that a portfolio of stocks of companies weighted by the 
number of candidates they have supported earned a 2.4% annual abnormal return. Faccio (2006) 
documents a greater than 2% increase in firm value when officers or large shareholders of a 
company enter politics. Roberts (1990) finds that the value of companies contributing to the 
campaigns of U.S. senator Henry Jackson declined with his death. And Fisman (2001) finds that 
the value of Indonesian companies connected to the Suharto family declined in parallel to the 
declining health of President Suharto.  
Companies employ corruption to circumvent CSP if the cost of doing so is lower than the 
cost of investing in CSP to the level that meets regulatory requirement. The cost of corruption is 
low in countries where corruption is rampant and punishment is light. This leads to our 
hypothesis on corruption:  
Hypothesis 2a: CSP is low in countries where corruption is high.  
3.2.2. Civil liberties and political rights: 
Companies face scrutiny and pressure to increase CSP from civil society, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and activist groups, amplified by the media. For example, 
Wal-Mart is scrutinized on labor relation, described by Bhatnagar (2004), Lobel (2007) and Tilly 
                                                            
3 http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2002/bush-administration-anti-environmental-policies-linked-to-corporate-
campaign-contributions 
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(2007), and Nike is scrutinized on working conditions at factories of suppliers in emerging 
countries, described by Greenberg and Knight (2004) and The Economist (2012). 
Companies regularly resort to deflection by ‘green-washing’ when pressure mounts, 
disclosing environmentally friendly programs to deflect attention from environmentally 
unfriendly activities (Marquis and Toffel, 2012). For example, Morris and King (2010) find that 
companies increase their publicity of social activities to deflect attention from boycotts.  
Civil society can counter deflection and press companies toward CSP when civil liberties 
and political rights are strong, enabling society members to express their concerns and mobilize 
for activism through organizations such as NGOs. Lyon and Maxwell (2011) find that the 
damage done to companies’ reputations by revelations of misrepresentation of activities 
detrimental to the environment is greater than the damage to reputation caused by the actual 
activities. Steinberg (2002) notes that the “challenges of sustained collective action are 
compounded when citizens fear for their safety or operate in a political environment where 
autonomous civic organization and the expression of dissenting views are considered a threat by 
state authorities.” This leads to our hypothesis on civil liberties and political rights:  
Hypothesis 2b: CSP is low in countries with weak civil liberties and political rights. 
3.3   Culture 
 Culture is a complex abstract concept. To capture culture differences across countries, 
some studies have used cultural variables that are quite general, such as the dominant religion or 
the language spoken in a country, to examine the effects of culture on economic decisions (e.g., 
La Porta et al., 1999; Stulz and Williamson, 2003). We use a culture framework that is more 
structured – the system of values and beliefs that underlies more specific formal institutions and 
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informal ones (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000; Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz, 2013). Our culture 
variables come from Schwartz (1999) and Hofstede (1980, 2001). 
3.3.1. Harmony: 
Schwartz (1999) identifies Harmony as a cultural dimension that relates people to the 
natural and social world. Harmony is “a cultural emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the 
environment (unity with nature, protecting the environment, world of beauty).” People in 
harmonious societies appreciate the natural and social environment and try to fit into it rather 
than to change or exploit it. Mastery, at the opposite end from Harmony, encourages active self-
assertion in order to master, direct, and change the natural and social environment to attain group 
or personal goals. Cultures of harmony constrain companies from stinting on CSP. This leads to 
our hypothesis on harmony: 
Hypothesis 3a: CSP is high in harmonious countries. 
3.3.2. Egalitarianism: 
Egalitarian cultures “induce societal members to recognize one another as moral equals 
who share basic interests as human beings. People are socialized to internalize a commitment to 
cooperate and to feel concern for everyone's welfare. People are expected to act for the benefit of 
others as a matter of choice” (Schwartz, 1999). Hierarchy is at the opposite end from 
egalitarianism. Schwartz (1999) writes that hierarchy cultures “rely on hierarchical systems of 
ascribed roles to insure responsible, productive behavior. People in hierarchical cultures accept 
unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources as legitimate and even desirable. They accept 
hierarchical distribution of roles, comply with the obligations and rules attached to their roles, 
show deference to superiors, and expect deference from subordinates. People in egalitarian 
cultures constrain companies by demanding companies to maintain high CSP, treat their 
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employees well and, more generally, promote and protect human rights. This lead to our 
hypothesis on egalitarianism: 
Hypothesis 3b: CSP is high in egalitarian countries.  
3.3.3. Autonomy  
Our third cultural dimension concerns the nature of the relation between individuals and 
others in society. Autonomy is at one end of this dimension. Schwartz (1999) distinguishes 
between two types: intellectual autonomy, which “encourages individuals to pursue their own 
ideas and intellectual directions independently,” and affective autonomy, which “encourages 
individuals to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves.” Embeddedness is at the 
other end of this dimension. Schwartz writes that embedded cultures emphasize maintaining the 
status quo and restraining actions that might disrupt the traditional order.  
Autonomy and Embeddedness are related to Individualism and Collectivism in that all 
address relationship between one person and others. Yet their notions of others differ, and the 
difference matters. Hofstede (1980, 2001) defines Individualism as “a preference for a loosely-
knit social framework in which individuals are expected to take care of themselves and their 
immediate families only.” At the opposite end is Collectivism which, in Hofstede’s words, 
“represents a preference for a tightly-knit framework in society in which individuals can expect 
their relatives or members of a particular in-group to look after them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty.”  
Autonomy culture places each person at the center but does not distinguish the others of 
immediate family or extended family from the others of humanity. In contrast, the others in 
Individualism culture are anyone outside one’s immediate family, and others in Collectivism 
culture are anyone outside one’s extended family and friends.  
15 
 
We expect people from autonomy cultures to press for CSP more than those from 
embeddedness cultures that emphasize maintaining the status quo and the traditional order. 
Consider global warming. People in autonomy cultures are likely to care about the harm global 
warming might do to them as individuals, but they are also likely to care about the harm it might 
do to humanity. Moreover, they are likely ready to challenge the status quo and traditional order 
by pressing companies to increase CSP to mitigate global warming. This leads to our hypothesis 
on autonomy: 
Hypothesis 3c: CSP is high in countries where autonomy is high.  
3.3.4. Power Distance 
Our fourth cultural dimension is Power Distance, also identified by Hofstede (1980). 
Power distance, according to Hofstede, “expresses the degree to which the less powerful 
members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. The fundamental 
issue here is how a society handles inequalities among people. People in societies exhibiting a 
large degree of power distance accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place and 
needs no further justification. In societies with low power distance, people strive to equalize the 
distribution of power and demand justification for inequalities of power.” 
High power distance allows managers to pursue their own interests and those of their 
shareholders with little regard for other stakeholders and the broader society. High power 
distance is also associated with high corruption (Getz and Volkema, 2001; Davis and Ruhe, 
2003), suggesting that in countries where power distance is high corporate managers are more 
likely to exploit stakeholders and the broader society than support them. This leads to our 
hypothesis on power distance: 
Hypothesis 3d: CSP is high in countries where power distance is low. 
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4. Sample and Data Description   
 We obtain environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings of companies from the 
MSCI ESG Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) database. MSCI identifies five ESG key issues, 
defined as “an environmental and/or social externality that has the potential to become 
internalized by the industry or the company.” Each key issue is assigned a weight, determined by 
its importance in the industry. Information on these key issues is collected primarily from public 
sources and evaluated. Each company is assigned a score for each of the key issues, and the 
overall score is determined by the weighted average of the key issue scores. The scores are then 
industry-adjusted by normalizing the overall score to the industry peer set. Based on the 
industry-adjusted scores, each company is then assigned a letter rating ranging from the best 
(AAA) to the worst (CCC). We use the overall IVA rating as our main measure of CSP, and 
higher ratings indicate better industry-adjusted CSP. We convert letter ratings into numerical 
ratings where 1 corresponds to CCC and 7 corresponds to AAA.  
 Our MSCI IVA data include 2,632 companies during 2006 through 2011, representing 
approximately 96% of the market cap of the MSCI World Index. To ascertain that our results are 
not dependent on countries with very small number of companies, we exclude countries with 
fewer than five companies in the MSCI IVA data. Our results remain qualitatively the same 
when we exclude countries with fewer than ten companies.  
We obtain country data from several sources. We use Income-per-capita in 2010 from the 
World Bank to measure levels of economic development. The 2010 Corruption Perception Index 
by Transparency International is a measure of absence of corruption. Each year, Transparency 
International ranks countries on a scale from zero of highly corrupt countries to 10 of highly 
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clean countries. Our measure of lack of civil liberties & political rights is from the World 2010 
report of Freedom House. Freedom House assigns each country a rating on a scale from 1 (the 
highest level of civil liberties or political rights) to 7 (the lowest level).  
Our culture dimensions come from two sources. Individualism and Power distance scores 
are from Hofstede (1980, 2001). Harmony, Egalitarianism, Intellectual Autonomy, and Affective 
Autonomy scores are from Schwartz (1999).4  Higher score indicates cultures more oriented 
towards greater individualism, power distance, harmony, egalitarianism, and autonomy.  
In addition, we control for the extent of legal protection a country offers to shareholders. 
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that shareholders’ legal protection matters for companies’ financing 
and investment decisions. We use the anti-self-dealing index developed by Djankov et al. (2008) 
as our measure of shareholder protection. We also control for a set of firm characteristics that are 
known to affect CSP. Data on these characteristics come from the Worldscope database. Hong et 
al. (2012) document that financially constrained companies invest less in CSP than less 
constrained companies. We capture levels of financial constraints with three proxies: 1) company 
size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; 2) the amount of financial slack, 
measured by the ratio of cash to total assets; and 3) the magnitude of cash flows, measured by 
the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets.  
Firms may engage in CSP strategically to differentiate their products (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001). We use the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales as a proxy for product 
differentiation. Firms with profitable investment opportunities might invest less in CSP as they 
have attractive alternatives for their funds. We use market-to-book ratio (M/B) to proxy for 
investment opportunities. We also control for firm financial performance, measured by returns 
                                                            
4 Although using Hofstede’s and Schwartz’s cultural framework may raise the concern that the data are outdated, 
Zheng, Ghoul, Guedhami, and Kwok (2012) provide a detailed discussion on why these measures retain their 
validity over a long period. 
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on assets (ROA). We use closely-held shares to proxy for firms’ ownership structure. Closely-
held shares are the fraction of shares held by insiders (or by the ten largest shareholders in Japan). 
Finally, cross-listed firms are able to borrow institutions from the host countries, possibly 
weakening the effects of the institutions of their home countries. We use American Depository 
Receipt (ADR) as an indicator of cross listing. ADR equals one if the company has a traded 
American Depository Receipt and zero otherwise.  
Our final sample includes 6,739 firm-year observations from 2,632 unique firms in 36 
countries. Table 1 reports the number of firms, the number of firm-year observations, and the 
basic statistics on the overall CSP ratings for each country. The median number of firms in a 
country is 24, but our sample includes many more firms in developed than in emerging 
countries.5 The U.S. has the largest number of firms (762), followed by Japan (358) and the U.K. 
(341).  
There is considerable variation in CSP ratings across countries but ratings are generally 
higher in developed countries than in emerging countries. The mean CSP rating for companies in 
developed countries is 4.03, statistically significantly higher than the 3.42 mean of companies in 
emerging countries. While not reported, our results are unchanged if we use median CSP ratings 
in place of mean CSP ratings. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of companies across industries. Our sample spans a wide 
range of industries. The top five industries are banks, retail, real estate, metals & mining, and 
construction, representing 6.87%, 6.25%, 5.71%, 4.76%, and 4.24 of our sample, respectively. 
 Table 3 Panel A presents descriptive statistics of our sample. The mean overall CSP 
rating in our sample is 3.99, and the median is 4. To minimize the potential impact of large 
                                                            
5 We classify countries into developed and emerging categories following the World Bank definition. Emerging 
countries are low-income and middle-income economies based on gross national income per capita. 
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outliers, we winsorize all continuous firm-level variables at the top and bottom 1%. A median 
firm in our sample has total assets of 2.81 billion, a ROA of 24%, an M/B ratio of 1.79, and a 
cash-to-assets ratio of 0.3. Approximately 23% of firms in our sample have traded ADRs. 
 We also report statistics on country-median of overall CSP ratings. For each country, we 
compute its country-median as the median value of the corresponding ratings across all firm-
years in that country. The country-median overall CSP rating across countries has a mean of 3.83, 
with a maximum of 5 and a minimum of 2. The country-median CSP is 5 in eleven countries, 
including France, Finland, Sweden, and the UK. All but one (South Africa) are developed 
countries. Four emerging countries, China, Israel, Mexico, and Turkey, rank the lowest, with a 
country median of 2. The median rating for the United States is 3. The average of the country-
median overall CSP rating is 4.29 among developed countries, significantly higher than the 3.2 
average among emerging countries. These CSP ratings suggest that while levels of economic 
development plays an important role in explaining cross-country variations in CSP, other factors 
matter as well. 
Table 3 also presents our measures of economic development, country institutions, and 
culture. Countries in our sample have a median income-per-capita of $33,974 (10.43 on natural 
log scale), with a minimum of $1,160 (India) and a maximum of $84,718 (Norway). Other 
country factors also exhibit significant variations. For example, Denmark, New Zealand, and 
Singapore rank highest on Absence of corruption, with a score of 9.3, and the United States ranks 
22nd, with a score of 7.1. Corruption is highest in Russia, 2.1, Indonesia, 2.8, and Mexico, 3.1.  
Table 3 Panel B shows that country-medians of overall CSP ratings are significantly 
correlated with all country factors. The correlation coefficients are large and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, mostly at 1% level. The absolute values of the correlation coefficients 
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range from a low of 0.46 between IVA and Absence of corruption to a high of 0.64 between IVA 
and Lack of civil liberties & political rights as well as IVA and Affective autonomy.   
Median CSP ratings are high in countries with high levels of economic development, 
measured by the natural logarithm of income-per-capita, Ln(Income-per-capita). The correlation 
between the overall IVA ratings and Ln(Income-per-capita) is 0.56, statistically significant at 1% 
level.  In general, median CSP ratings are also high in countries with low levels of corruption, 
strong civil liberties and political rights, and weak shareholder protection. Moreover, median 
CSP ratings are highly correlated with all of our cultural factors. In particular, median CSP 
ratings tend to be high in countries with cultures oriented towards harmony, egalitarianism, 
autonomy, individualism, and low power distance.  
Country factors are correlated with each other. The level of economic development is 
highly correlated with all other country factors. The absolute values of the correlation 
coefficients range from 0.29 between Ln(Income-per-capita) and Anti-self-dealing index to 0.80 
between Ln(Income-per-capita) and Absence of corruption. Correlations among measures of 
country institutions and culture are also high. For example, the correlation between Absence of 
corruption and Power distance is -0.68, and the correlation between Lack of civil liberty and 
political right and Egalitarianism is -0.77.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 What determines CSP ratings? Company characteristics and country factors 
  We begin with a panel regression examining the determinants of CSP ratings across 
companies from all countries.  
0 1 , 1jkt j t i t k jktCSP X                                                        (1) 
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jktCSP is the CSP rating of company j of country k at time t. , 1j tX  is a vector of company 
characteristics at the beginning of year t, including size (Ln(Assets)), financial slack 
(Cash/Assets), operating cash flows (Op. CF/Assets), product differentiation (R&D expenses), 
investment opportunities (M/B), profitability (ROA), leverage (Leverage), ownership structure 
(Closely-held shares), and whether the firm has a traded ADR (ADR). All regressions include 
year- and industry-fixed effects ( t , i ) to control for time trends and potential heterogeneity 
across industries. In some model specifications we also include country fixed effects ( k ). We 
cluster the standard errors by firm to address any potential correlations in the residuals over time.  
We report the regression results for the overall CSP ratings (Overall IVA ratings) in 
Table 4 Panel A. In column (1), we include only company characteristics and find that variation 
in company characteristics explains only 6.7% of variation in CSP ratings. In column (2), we 
include only country fixed effects while excluding all company characteristics. Using country 
fixed effects yields an upper bound of the effects of all possible country factors, including those 
that are unobservable or not considered in our analysis. Comparing columns (1) and (2), we find 
that countries account for 13.4% the total variations in overall CSP ratings, twice as much as 
what firm characteristics can explain (2.0=0.134/0.067). In column 3, we include both company 
characteristics and country fixed effects, and find that together they account for 18.6% of the 
total variations in CSP ratings. Adding country dummies to the set of firm characteristics 
significantly improves the overall explanatory power of our model. 
 Consistent with Hong et al. (2012), we find that larger and more profitable companies 
with higher cash levels have higher CSP ratings. The coefficient on R&D expenses is positive 
although not statistically significant. The positive coefficient of R&D expenses is consistent with 
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McWilliams and Siegel (2001) who argue that CSP serves as a differentiation strategy. On 
average, CSP is higher among companies that have traded ADRs and higher leverage.  
 Corporate governance is a commonly included subcategory of CSP. For example, the 
term ESG refers to environmental, social and governance issues, and our CSP data also include 
measures of corporate governance. Doidge et al. (2007) show that country factors explain far 
more of the variance of corporate governance than company characteristics. One potential 
concern of our result is that we may be capturing the impact of country factors in corporate 
governance rather than the broader CSP.  
 To address this concern, we exclude corporate governance and consider the other two 
CSP components, environmental and social ratings. The Environmental rating is based on key 
issues related to protecting the environment, such as carbon emissions or biodiversity and land 
use. The Social rating is based on key issues related to social issues, such as labor management 
or privacy and data security. The means of the environmental and social ratings are 3.87 and 4.04, 
respectively. Using the average of the environmental and the social ratings as the dependent 
variable, we present the regression results in columns (4)-(6) of Table 4 Panel A. We continue to 
find that countries are much more important than companies in determining the non-corporate-
governance aspects of CSP.  
In Panel B of Table 4, we also examine the three CSP components separately. The 
dependent variable is corporate governance in columns (1)-(3), environmental ratings in in 
columns (4)-(6), and social ratings in columns (7)-(9), respectively. Consistent with Doidge et al. 
(2007), we find that variation in country factors account for more of variation in corporate 
governance than company characteristics. In addition, countries are much more important than 
companies in determining environmental and social ratings. This is especially true for social 
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ratings, where the explanatory power attributed by country factors is 2.13 (=0.115/0.054) times 
of that attributed by firm characteristics. 
5.2 Why do country factors matter so much? 
 As discussed in Section 3, the optimal level of CSP for a value-maximizing firm depends 
on both the benefits firms derive from investing in CSP and the costs of circumvention. 
Countries matter because both benefits and costs are shaped, to a large extent, by institutions in a 
country as well as by values and belief systems deeply rooted in the society. Our comparative 
statics show that the optimal level of CSP is relatively high in countries where the benefits of 
investing in CSP are high and the costs of circumvention are high.  
In this section, we test our earlier hypotheses about CSP and economic development, 
political systems, and culture to answer more fully the question of why country factors account 
for so much of the variation in CSP ratings, We measure the CSP of a country by the median of 
CSP ratings of all companies in that country. We focus on medians because they help overcome 
problems introduced by differences in the number of companies in each country and minimize 
potential distortions caused by outliers. Table 5 summarizes the results. 
5.2.1 Economic development   
Hypothesis 1 states that CSP ratings are higher in countries with higher economic 
development. Our findings in Table 5 Model (1) are consistent with this hypothesis. The 
coefficient of Ln(income-per-capita) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. An 
inter-quartile increase in income-per-capita, from the level of Russia to the level of Belgium, is 
associated with a 0.752 increase in country-median CSP ratings. The mean of country-median 
CSP ratings across countries is 3.83, implying that the association between CSP and income-per-
capita is not only statistically significant but also economically large.  
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While variations in income-per-capita across countries account for 23.1% of variations in 
country-median CSP ratings, income-per-capita is a good predictor of country-median CSP 
ratings in some countries but not in others. Figure 1 plots country-median CSP ratings against 
Ln(income-per-capita). The line presents predicted country-median CSP ratings corresponding to 
income-per-capita levels. Income-per-capita is a good predictor of country-median CSP ratings 
for Japan, Belgium, and Thailand, but not for China, France, Sweden, and the U.S., suggesting 
that factors other than levels of economic development play important roles in predicting 
country-median CSP ratings.  
Table 3 Panel B shows that economic development is significantly correlated with all 
other country factors, making it difficult to disentangle the relation between CSP and economic 
development and the relation between CSP and other country factors such as corruption. While 
the direction of causality between economic development and other country factors is beyond the 
scope of our study, we control for income-per-capita to assess the relation between CSP and 
other country factors. We follow Djankov et al. (2008) by orthogonalizing each factor against 
Ln(income-per-capita) and use the orthogonalized factor to estimate the incremental association 
of that factor with CSP. For each factor, we present side-by-side results with the raw factor and 
the orthogonalized factor.  
5.2.2 Political systems 
Hypothesis 2a states that CSP is low in countries where corruption is high. In countries 
where corruption is rampant, companies find it cheaper to circumvent CSP than invest in CSP to 
meet regulatory requirement. Table 5 Model (2) shows that coefficient of raw Absence of 
corruption is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level when we regress country-
median CSP ratings on raw Absence of corruption. This result is consistent with the hypothesis, 
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we find that the coefficient on the orthogonalized Absence of corruption is no longer statistically 
significant, probably due to the strong correlation between raw Absence of corruption and 
Ln(income-per-capita). Table 3 shows that the two have a correlation coefficient of 0.8, 
indicating that corruption is prevalent in countries with low income-per-capita. This high 
correlation makes it difficult to distinguish the association between CSP and corruption from the 
association between CSP and income-per-capita.  
Hypothesis 2b states that CSP is low in countries where civil liberties and political rights 
are weak. Our results in Table 5 Model (3) are consistent with this hypothesis. We find that the 
coefficients of Lack of civil liberties & political rights are negative and statistically significant at 
1% level for both the raw and the orthogonalized factor, suggesting countries with weak civil 
liberties and political rights exhibit lower CSP.  
Half the countries, including the U.S. and many European countries, have perfect civil 
liberties and political rights scores according to Freedom House’s 2010 annual survey. Their 
Lack of civil liberties & political rights is 1. The other half exhibits much variation, ranging from 
1.5 in Japan and Italy to 6.5 in China.6 In general, countries with higher income-per-capita enjoy 
stronger civil liberties and political rights (the correlation between the two is -0.76). An 
interquartile increase in Lack of civil liberties & political rights, equivalent to moving from the 
level in the U.S. (1) to the level in India or Mexico (2.5), is associated with a 0.50 decrease in the 
country-median CSP ratings, after accounting for differences in income-per-capita.  Moreover, 
Lack of civil liberties political rights explains as much as 35.5% of the overall variations in 
country-median CSP ratings. Our findings are consistent with the notion that strong civil liberties 
                                                            
6 Note that the scores of civil liberties and political rights from Transparency International are such that high scores 
indicate poor civil liberties and political rights. As such, the scores capture the Lack of civil liberties political right. 
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and political rights enable society members to express their concerns and press companies 
toward higher CSP.  
5.2.3 Culture 
Hypothesis 3a states that CSP is low in countries with low harmony. Our findings are 
consistent with this hypothesis. In Table 5 Model (4), the coefficient of Harmony is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level or better for both raw and orthogonalized Harmony. An 
interquartile increase in Harmony, as from the level in Indonesia to the level in Finland, is 
associated with an increase of 0.53 income-adjusted country-median CSP ratings. Furthermore, 
variations in Harmony explain 18.9% of the variations in country-median CSP ratings. 
Controlling for the effect of income-per-capita, variations in Harmony still account for 8.7% of 
variations in country-median CSP ratings. The low harmony scores of China and the U.S. may 
help explain their low income-adjusted country-median CSP ratings.  
Hypothesis 3b states that CSP is high in egalitarian countries. Our findings in Table 5 
Model (5) are somewhat consistent with this hypothesis. The coefficient of raw Egalitarianism is 
positive and statistically significant at 1% level, but the coefficient of orthogonalized 
Egalitarianism is not statistically significant.  
Hypothesis 3c states that CSP is high in countries where people are autonomous. Our 
findings In Table 5 Model (6) and (7) are consistent with this hypothesis. For both Intellectual 
Autonomy and Affective Autonomy, we find that the coefficients of both raw and orthogonalized 
factor are positive and statistically significant. The association between CSP and autonomy is 
also economically large. An interquartile increase in Intellectual Autonomy, equivalent to 
moving from the level in South Korea to the level in the Netherlands, is associated with an 
increase of 0.65 in income-adjusted country-median CSP ratings. The corresponding increase in 
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income-adjusted country-median CSP ratings associated with an interquartile increase in 
Affective autonomy is 0.80. 
Autonomy plays an important role in explaining the variations in country-median CSP 
ratings. Controlling for income-per-capita, variation in Intellectual Autonomy accounts for 6.9% 
of the variation in country-median CSP ratings, and variation in Affective autonomy accounts for 
14.7% of the variation in country-median CSP ratings.  
 Hypothesis 3d states that CSP is high in countries where power distance is low. Our 
findings are generally consistent with this hypothesis. The coefficient of raw Power distance in 
Table 5 Model (8) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of 
orthogonalized Power distance, however, is no longer statistically significant.  
5.3 CSP and all country factors 
 We find that economic development, political systems, and culture are associated with 
country-median CSP levels. Yet these country factors are highly correlated with one another, 
making it difficult to disentangle the effect of one from another. Still, we can estimate how much 
of the variation in country-median CSP ratings is accounted for by all country factors. 
In Table 5 Model (9), we include all the country factors as independent variables in one 
regression where the dependent variable is country-median CSP ratings. While multicollinearity 
removes statistical significance from most coefficients, we see that variations in country factors 
altogether account for 49.1% of the variation in country-median CSP ratings.  
In the last row of Table 5, we examine a much bigger set of country factors. The 
additional country factors come from Ioannou and Serafeim’s (2012), who use a broader set of 
country factors, such as labor and education systems, competition, and leftist political ideology, 
to study the role of nation-level institutions on CSP. The addition of these factors does not add 
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explanatory power factors beyond Model (9). The adjusted R2 is 0.463, suggesting that these 
factors altogether account for 46.3% of the variation in country-median CSP ratings. 
 
6. Robustness 
6.1 Multinationals 
 Some companies are multinationals, with operations in both their home country and host 
countries, while others operate almost exclusively in their home country. Ioannou and Serafeim 
(2012) note that multinationals may be influenced by institutions in both home-country and host-
country. Campbell, Eden, and Miller (2012) find that distance from the home country is 
inversely related to the level of CSP of a multinational in a host country. This might imply that 
home-country institutions affect multinationals less than they affect non-multinationals.  
 We classify companies as multinationals if at least 10% of their assets are in host-
countries. We obtain the ratio of host-country assets to total assets from Worldscope (data item 
08736). These data are available for 5,090 company-year observations, among which 2,857 are 
multinationals and the remaining 2,233 are non-multinationals.  
We rerun the panel regression of Table 4 separately for multinationals and non-
multinationals, and present the results in Table 6. Columns (1)-(3) report regression coefficients 
of multinationals, and columns (4)-(6) report the coefficients of non-multinationals. We find that 
variation in home country factors is much more important than variation in firm characteristics in 
explaining the total variation in CSP for non-multinationals (2.30=0.154/0.067) than for 
multinationals (1.31=0.136/0.104), suggesting that home country factors do not play as an 
important role in determining CSP for multinationals as for non-multinationals. 
6.2 Cross-listings 
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Financial globalization could reduce the importance of country factors for variations in 
CSP across countries. As Doidge et al. (2007) point out, cross-listing not only provides firms 
with access to foreign capital markets, reducing their dependence on the home countries, but also 
enables firms to “borrow” the institutions of the host country. Boubakri et al. (2016) find that 
cross-listed firms have better corporate social responsibility performance than their non-cross-
listed domestic peers. We would expect home country to be less important for the determination 
of  CSP for cross-listed firms than for their pure domestic peers.  
In each sample year, we classify a firm as cross-listed if its common shares are listed on 
one or more foreign stock exchanges in addition to its domestic exchange in that year. Among 
6,739 firm-year observations in our sample, 1,514 are cross-listed and 5,225 are not. We rerun 
the panel regression of Table 4 separately for cross-listed firms and non-cross-listed firms. Table 
7 summarizes our results. Columns (1)-(3) report regression coefficients of cross-listed firms, 
and columns (4)-(6) report the coefficients of non-cross-listed firms. We find that for cross-listed 
firms, the explanatory power of home country factors in determining CSP levels is 1.6 
(=0.157/0.098) times that of firm characteristics. In contrast, for non-cross-listed firms, the 
explanatory power of home country factors is 3.7 (=0.138/0.037) times that of firm 
characteristics, suggesting that home country factors are much more important for non-cross-
listed firms than for cross-listed firms. Our results are consistent with the notion that financial 
globalization reduces the importance of home country by providing firms with access to the 
financial markets as well as the institutions of the host countries. 
6.3 Alternative measure of CSP 
We use the overall MSCI IVA rating as our main measure of CSP. MSCI assigns ratings 
for each company for each of the key issues, and the overall rating IVA are determined by the 
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weighted average of the key-issue ratings. Specifically, “analysts work with sector team leaders 
to make any necessary adjustments to the weightings in the model. Each key issue typically 
comprises 10-30% of the total IVA rating. The weightings take into account both the 
contribution of the industry, relative to all other industries, to the negative or positive impact on 
environment or society; and the timeline within which we expect that financial risk or 
opportunity for companies in the industry would be expected to materialize.”  
To check the robustness of our results, we construct an alternative IVA measure. 
Following Goss and Roberts (2011) and Ioannou and Serafeim (2012), we perform a principal 
components analysis (PCA) using all subcategories of CSP ratings. MSCI provides data on eight 
IVA subcategories in addition to the overall IVA rating. They include Strategic Governance, 
Human Capital, Stakeholder Capital, Products and Services, Emerging Markets, Environmental 
Risk, Environmental Management Capacity, and Environmental Opportunity. 
 We extract common components from the eight subcategories and combine them into a 
one-dimensional index of CSP. Using a single factor, instead of the eight subcategories 
individually, we increase the power of the regression tests by avoiding the problems arising from 
multicollinearity and minimizing measurement error. 
Table 8 Panel A presents the results of the principal component analysis of the eight IVA 
subcategories. The alternative IVA measure, IVA_PCA, is the first component of the principal 
components analysis of the subcategories, which is a linear combination of the eight 
subcategories where more weight is given to those that reflect a company’s CSP more accurately. 
The eigenvalue is 3.27, higher than one.  
In Panel B and C of Table 8, we replicate the same analyses as in Table 4 and 5 using 
IVA_PCA as the main dependent variable. We continue to find that country factors account for 
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more of the variation in CSP ratings than company characteristics. In addition, economic 
development, institutional, and culture factors remain as important determinants of CSP ratings. 
 
7. Conclusion  
We find that country factors are much more important than firm characteristics in 
explaining the variations in CSP ratings. The differences in stages of economic development, 
measured by income-per-capita, explain some of the differences between CSP ratings among 
countries but other parts of differences are explained by differences in factors of culture and 
institutions. In particular, we find that CSP ratings are high in countries with high income-per-
capita, strong civil liberties and political rights, and cultures oriented toward harmony and 
autonomy.  
Country factors matter for CSP because they affect companies’ costs of investing in CSP 
and the benefits companies derive from such investments. Corporations are likely to adjust their 
CSP levels as CSP inducements and constraints change, even if the changes are slow. Food is the 
most urgent need when income is low, but desire for clean water and air become increasingly 
pressing as income increases. The outcome of the 2015 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference testifies to that desire. Higher incomes also spur demands for greater civil liberties 
and political rights, which in turn are associated with higher CSP ratings.  
Our study expands the previous literature and offers new evidence on the relative 
importance of firm characteristics and country factors in explaining CSP ratings. We show that 
country factors such as economic development, institutions, and culture are important 
determinants for corporate social performance. One caveat of our paper is that we do not 
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separately examine the impacts of CSP strengths and concerns due to data availability, and we 
leave this for future research.  
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APPENDIX: Variable definitions 
Corporate Social Performance 
Overall IVA rating Overall CSP ratings ranging from 1 (MSCI rating CCC) to 7 (MSCI 
rating AAA) from MSCI 
Average of environmental 
and social ratings 
Average of environmental and social ratings from MSCI 
Corporate governance Ratings based on traditional governance concerns such as board 
independence, board diversity, compensation practices, controversies 
involving executive compensation and governance from MSCI 
Environmental rating Ratings based on key issues related to protecting the environment from 
MSCI 
Social rating Ratings based on key issues related to social issues from MSCI 
Country Factors  
Income-per-capita GNP per capita from the World Bank 
Absence of corruption 2010 Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International 
Lack of civil liberties & 
political rights 
Freedom House’s annual survey of civil liberties and political rights, 
from Freedom in the World 2010 report 
Harmony Harmony from Schwartz (1999) 
Egalitarianism Egalitarianism from Schwartz (1999) 
Intellectual autonomy Intellectual autonomy from Schwartz (1999) 
Affective autonomy Affective autonomy from Schwartz (1999) 
Power distance  Power distance index from Hofstede (1980) 
Firm Characteristics  
ROA Earnings before interests / total assets 
M/B Market value of equity / book value of equity 
R&D expenses R&D expenditure / Sales 
Assets Total assets 
Closely-held shares the fraction of shares held by insiders, or by the ten largest 
shareholders for Japan 
Leverage Total debt / Total assets 
Cash/Assets Cash & due from banks / Total assets 
Op. CF/Assets Funds from operations / Total assets 
ADR An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm as a traded ADR, and 0 
otherwise 
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Table 1: MSCI IVA sample coverage and overall IVA ratings 
This table presents the sample coverage and the descriptive statistics of overall IVA ratings of 6,739 firm-
year observations from 2,632 unique firms in 36 countries from 2006 to 2011.  
 
  Number of Overall IVA ratings 
Country Firms Firm-Years Mean Median Std Min Max
Developed Countries 
Australia 234 790 3.95 4 1.50 1 7 
Austria 13 37 3.92 4 1.79 1 7 
Belgium 15 40 3.88 4 1.24 2 7 
Canada 145 314 3.98 4 1.65 1 7 
Denmark 20 51 4.71 5 1.81 2 7 
Finland 28 69 5.01 5 1.61 2 7 
France 93 258 4.99 5 1.36 1 7 
Germany 53 133 4.77 5 1.60 1 7 
Hong Kong 54 145 2.96 3 1.54 1 7 
Ireland 16 30 2.97 3 1.71 1 6 
Italy 48 119 3.87 4 1.69 1 7 
Japan 358 1,005 4.12 4 1.60 1 7 
Netherlands 33 77 4.90 5 1.64 2 7 
New Zealand 12 19 4.32 4 1.80 1 7 
Norway 17 39 4.92 5 1.38 2 7 
Singapore 27 73 3.62 3 1.81 1 7 
Spain 42 108 4.82 5 1.61 1 7 
Sweden 44 112 4.94 5 1.60 1 7 
Switzerland 49 118 4.53 5 1.71 1 7 
United Kingdom 341 825 4.59 5 1.72 1 7 
United States 762 1,987 3.50 3 1.61 1 7 
Developed countries 2,404 6,349 4.03 4 1.69 1 7
Emerging countries 
Brazil 25 32 4.41 4 1.50 1 7 
Chile 9 17 3.00 3 1.54 1 6 
China 19 27 1.93 2 1.00 1 4 
Greece 8 22 3.86 4 1.49 2 7 
India 25 44 3.23 3 1.54 1 7 
Indonesia 8 11 3.09 4 1.38 1 5 
Israel 14 18 2.72 2 1.23 1 5 
Korea, South 31 55 3.58 4 1.46 1 7 
Malaysia 13 24 2.71 3 1.08 1 5 
Mexico 10 13 2.15 2 1.21 1 4 
Portugal 12 35 4.46 4 1.48 2 7 
Russia 23 35 2.89 3 1.37 1 5 
South Africa 17 38 4.74 5 1.35 2 7 
Thailand 7 10 3.20 3 0.79 2 4 
Turkey 7 9 2.44 2 0.88 1 4 
Emerging countries 228 390 3.42 3 1.58 1 7
Overall 2,632 6,739 3.99 4 1.69 1 7
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Table 2: Industry distribution of firm-year observations in MSCI-IVA 
This table presents the industry distribution of 6,739 firm-year observations from 2,632 unique firms in 
36 countries from 2006 to 2011.  
 
Industry # of firm-years % of firm-years
Advertising 33 0.49 
Aerospace & Defense 74 1.1 
Air Freight & Logistics 28 0.42 
Airlines 58 0.86 
Asset Management 125 1.85 
Automobiles 140 2.08 
BSE 1 0.01 
Banks 463 6.87 
Beverages 42 0.62 
Biotechnology 52 0.77 
Broadcasting & Cable TV 117 1.74 
Building Products 62 0.92 
Casinos & Gaming 27 0.4 
Chemicals 196 2.91 
Commercial Services & Supplies 128 1.9 
Communications Equipment 51 0.76 
Computers & Peripherals 59 0.88 
Construction 286 4.24 
Consumer Finance 42 0.62 
Containers & Packaging 32 0.47 
Diversified Consumer Services 19 0.28 
Diversified Financials 80 1.19 
Electric Utilities 237 3.52 
Electronic Equipment & Instruments 125 1.85 
Energy Equipment & Services 68 1.01 
Food Products 121 1.8 
Gas Utilities 80 1.19 
Healthcare 255 3.78 
Hotels 79 1.17 
Household 170 2.52 
Human Resource & Employment Services 17 0.25 
Industrial Conglomerates 77 1.14 
Industrial Machinery 130 1.93 
Insurance 186 2.76 
Integrated Oil & Gas 105 1.56 
Investment Banking & Brokerage 34 0.5 
Leisure Equipment & Products 34 0.5 
Metals & Mining 321 4.76 
Movies & Entertainment 20 0.3 
Multi-Utilities & Unregulated Power 105 1.56 
Oil & Gas Exploration & Production 190 2.82 
Oil & Gas Refining & Marketing 43 0.64 
Paper & Forest Products 60 0.89 
Pharmaceuticals 150 2.23 
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Professional Services 17 0.25 
Public Services 25 0.37 
Publishing 81 1.2 
Real Estate 385 5.71 
Restaurants 31 0.46 
Retail 421 6.25 
Semiconductor Equipment & Products 129 1.91 
Software & IT Services 169 2.51 
Steel 99 1.47 
Telecommunication 209 3.1 
Textiles, Apparel & Luxury Goods 63 0.93 
Tobacco 86 1.28 
Trading Companies & Distributors 83 1.23 
Transportation 219 3.25 
Total 6,739 100 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Panel A of this table presents the descriptive statistics of 6,739 firm-year observations from 2,632 unique 
firms in 36 countries from 2006 to 2011. Panel B presents the correlation coefficient of country factors, 
and * indicates 10% statistical significance level or better. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std Min P25 P75 Max 
Firm Characteristics 
IVA rating 6,739  3.99 4.00 1.69 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 
Average 
(environmental, social) 
 
6,739 3.95 4.00 1.93 1.00 3.00 500 7.00 
Corporate governance 6,739 3.96 4.00 1.53 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 
Environmental  6,739  3.87 4.00 1.79 1.00 2.00 5.00 7.00 
Social 6,739  4.04 4.00 1.72 1.00 3.00 5.00 7.00 
Assets (in millions) 6,739  3,590 2,810 2,510 41 1,530 5,170 10,000 
ROA 6,739  0.66 0.24 1.02 -0.31 0.09 0.85 5.91 
M/B 6,739  2.51 1.79 3.02 -7.52 1.11 3.04 19.67 
R&D expenses 6,739  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Leverage 6,739  1.04 0.41 1.30 0.00 0.22 1.56 5.71 
Cash/Assets 6,739  0.44 0.30 0.38 0.00 0.09 0.90 1.00 
Op. CF/Assets 6,739  0.68 0.28 0.96 -0.15 0.11 0.94 5.83 
Closedly held shares 6,739  0.24 0.17 0.23 0.00 0.02 0.40 1.52 
ADR 6,739  0.23 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Country-Median IVA Ratings 
Emerging countries 15 3.20 3.00 0.94 2.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 
Developed countries 21 4.29 4.00 0.78 3.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 
All countries 36 3.83 4.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 
Country Factors 
Ln(GNP per capita) 36 9.98 10.43 1.04 7.06 9.15 10.71 11.35 
Absence of corruption 36 6.45 7.10 2.32 2.10 4.15 8.65 9.30 
Lack of civil liberties & 
political rights 36 1.93 1.00 1.44 1.00 1.00 2.50 6.50 
Harmony 36 4.06 4.04 0.34 3.28 3.83 4.35 4.62 
Egalitarianism 36 4.79 4.87 0.30 4.23 4.51 5.04 5.27 
Intellectual autonomy 36 4.51 4.52 0.38 3.85 4.25 4.82 5.32 
Affective autonomy 36 3.73 3.73 0.42 2.83 3.44 4.08 4.39 
Power distance index 36 52.42 55.50 22.84 11.00 34.50 68.00 104.00 
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Panel B: Correlation table 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IVA rating (1) 1 
Ln(Income-per-capita) (2) 0.56* 
Absence of corruption (3) 0.46* 0.80* 
Lack of civil liberties & political rights (4) -0.64* -0.76* -0.63* 
Harmony (5) 0.48* 0.31* 0.08 -0.42* 
Egalitarianism (6) 0.57* 0.57* 0.41* -0.77* 0.68* 
Intellectual autonomy (7) 0.61* 0.70* 0.49* -0.70* 0.67* 0.73* 
Affective autonomy (8) 0.64* 0.72* 0.57* -0.74* 0.23 0.46* 0.69* 
Power distance index (10) -0.49* -0.71* -0.68* 0.73* -0.19 -0.47* -0.6* -0.72* 
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Table 4: Determinants of CSP ratings: Firm characteristics vs country factors 
This table presents OLS regression results for the 6,739 sample companies from 36 countries covered 
in MSCI IVA database. All variables are defined in the Appendix. p-values based on standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
 
Panel A: Overall CSP ratings 
  Overall IVA Ratings Average (Environmental, Social) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ROA 0.048 0.088*** 0.045* 0.079*** 
(0.111) (0.003) (0.093) (0.002) 
M/B 0.002 0.015* 0.005 0.017** 
(0.794) (0.067) (0.472) (0.010) 
R&D expenses 5.664 5.038 12.310** 11.661*** 
(0.271) (0.287) (0.013) (0.008) 
Ln(Assets) 0.167*** 0.419*** 0.185*** 0.416*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Closely-held shares -0.461*** -0.336*** -0.502*** -0.360*** 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.003) 
Leverage 0.066** 0.102*** 0.055** 0.090*** 
(0.012) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) 
Cash/Assets 0.105 0.525*** 0.185** 0.572*** 
(0.275) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) 
Op. CF/Assets -0.014 0.092*** -0.010 0.088*** 
(0.698) (0.007) (0.768) (0.004) 
ADR 0.757*** 0.368*** 0.722*** 0.372*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 2.317*** 3.391*** 0.194 2.046*** 3.352*** 0.077 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.713) (0.000) (0.000) (0.860) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 6,739 6,739 6,739 6,739 6,739 6,739 
Adj. R-squared 0.067 0.134 0.186 0.080 0.140 0.203 
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Panel B: Separate CSP ratings 
  Corporate Governance Environmental  Social  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
ROA -0.057* 0.071** 0.067**   0.095*** 0.023  0.064** 
(0.082) (0.019) (0.035)   (0.002) (0.454)  (0.032) 
M/B 0.030*** 0.018** -0.000   0.014* 0.011  0.021** 
(0.001) (0.048) (0.983)   (0.057) (0.203)  (0.011) 
R&D expenses -10.125* -1.642 18.301***   16.816*** 6.319  6.506 
(0.073) (0.761) (0.003)   (0.002) (0.199)  (0.157) 
Ln(Assets) 0.053 0.343*** 0.268***   0.493*** 0.101***  0.339*** 
(0.131) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.004)  (0.000) 
Closely-held shares -1.542*** -0.927*** -0.459***   -0.310** -0.546***  -0.409*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.021) (0.000)  (0.002) 
Leverage 0.068** 0.077*** 0.051*   0.088*** 0.059**  0.092*** 
(0.014) (0.002) (0.060)   (0.001) (0.019)  (0.000) 
Cash/Assets -0.571*** 0.168* 0.412***   0.771*** -0.041  0.373*** 
(0.000) (0.077) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.657)  (0.000) 
Op. CF/Assets -0.055 0.060 0.025   0.123*** -0.044  0.054 
(0.162) (0.111) (0.503)   (0.000) (0.222)  (0.130) 
ADR 0.470*** 0.276*** 0.825***   0.481*** 0.619***  0.264*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 5.842*** 6.075*** 3.843*** 1.292*** 3.298*** -0.678 2.799*** 3.407*** 0.833* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.130) (0.000) (0.000) (0.097) 
                 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 6,739 6,739 6,739 6,739 6,739 6,739 6,739 6,739 6,739 
Adj. R-squared 0.106 0.179 0.206 0.099 0.126 0.197 0.054 0.115 0.146 
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Table 5: Determinants of overall IVA ratings 
This table presents OLS regression results for the sample of 36 countries covered in MSCI IVA database. 
The dependent variable in all regression models is the country-median value of overall IVA rating.  Column 
2 reports the name of the independent variable in the regression. Column 3 and 4 present results from 
regressions of country-median IVA on each raw independent variable. Columns 5 and 6 present results from 
regressions of country-median IVA on each orthogonalized independent variable w.r.t.  Ln(Income-per-capita). 
We report the regression coefficient on the independent variable and the associated p-values in columns 3 and 
5, and the adjusted R-squared in columns 4 and 6. In model (9), we include all the raw independent variables 
in one regression. In model (10), we include additional country factors that are in Ioannou and Serafeim’s 
(2012), including competition and regulation, anti-self dealing index, left ideology, union density, and the 
availability of skilled labor. To conserve space, for models (9) and (10) we omit the coefficients and 
associated p-values and only report the adj. R-squared. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
 
Independent variables are Raw  Orthogonalized 
Coeffi. Adj.  Coeffi. Adj.  
Model Independent variable (p-value) R-squared  (p-value) R-squared 
(1) Ln(Income-per-capita) 0.482*** 0.231   
(0.002)   
(2) Absence of corruption 0.201*** 0.195 0.077 -0.018 
(0.004) (0.481) 
(3) Lack of civil liberties & political rights -0.423*** 0.355 -0.335*** 0.123 
(0.000) (0.007) 
(4) Harmony 1.339*** 0.189 1.017** 0.087 
(0.005) (0.021) 
(5) Egalitarianism 1.700*** 0.236 1.057 0.032 
(0.002) (0.100) 
(6) Intellectual autonomy 1.511*** 0.307 1.132** 0.069 
(0.000) (0.035) 
(7) Affective autonomy 1.522*** 0.387 1.255*** 0.147 
(0.000) (0.004) 
(8) Power distance index -0.019*** 0.165 -0.008 -0.010 
(0.008) (0.363) 
(9) Overall fit (include all indep. var.) 0.491    
(10) 
Overall fit (including additional indep. var. 
from Ioannou and Serafeim (2012)) 0.463    
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Table 6: Comparing multinational firms with non-multinational firms 
This table reports OLS regression results from 5,090 companies, 2,857 multinationals and 2,233 non-
multinationals, from 36 countries covered in MSCI IVA database. In any year, a firm is classified as a 
multinational company if at least 10% of its total assets are foreign assets. The dependent variable is overall 
IVA ratings. Columns (1) to (3) present results using the subsample of multinationals, and columns (4) to (6) 
present results using the subsample of non-multinationals. All variables are defined in the Appendix. p-values 
based on standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed 
tests.  
 
 Multinationals  Non-Multinationals 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
ROA 0.020 0.037  0.054 0.074 
(0.629) (0.360)  (0.375) (0.251) 
M/B 0.018 0.026*  -0.012 0.001 
(0.255) (0.088)  (0.352) (0.963) 
R&D expenses 9.107 5.677  -2.504 1.840 
(0.207) (0.409)  (0.793) (0.845) 
Ln(Assets) 0.347*** 0.533***  -0.044 0.305*** 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.446) (0.000) 
Closely-held shares -0.654*** -0.455**  -0.139 -0.364* 
(0.001) (0.017)  (0.470) (0.086) 
Leverage 0.166*** 0.161***  -0.068* 0.022 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.097) (0.592) 
Cash/Assets 0.114 0.531***  -0.053 0.440*** 
(0.417) (0.000)  (0.734) (0.005) 
Op. CF/Assets -0.022 0.066  0.172** 0.275*** 
(0.690) (0.188)  (0.011) (0.000) 
ADR 0.701*** 0.486***  0.669*** 0.188 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.218) 
Constant 0.536 3.055*** -1.029  2.510** 2.744*** 0.414 
(0.511) (0.000) (0.187)  (0.011) (0.000) (0.632) 
        
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Observations 2,857 2,857 2,857  2,233 2,233 2,233 
Adj. R-squared 0.104 0.136 0.204  0.067 0.154 0.193 
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Table 7: Comparing cross-listed firms with pure domestic firms 
This table reports OLS regression results from 6,739 firm-year observations, 1,514 cross-listed and 5,225 
non cross-listed, from 36 countries covered in MSCI IVA database. In any year, a firm is classified as 
cross-listed if its common shares are listed on one or more foreign stock exchanges in addition to its domestic 
exchange in that year. The dependent variable is overall IVA ratings. Columns (1) to (3) present results using 
the subsample of cross-listed firms, and columns (4) to (6) present results using the subsample of non-cross-
listed firms. All variables are defined in the Appendix. p-values based on standard errors clustered at the 
firm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.  
 
  Cross-listed firms Non-cross-listed firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
      
ROA 0.089 0.133** 0.049 0.075**
(0.162) (0.026) (0.146) (0.021)
M/B -0.005 0.007 -0.007 0.011
(0.840) (0.771) (0.412) (0.175)
R&D expenses 21.555 22.404* 5.682 3.086
(0.131) (0.098) (0.265) (0.523)
Ln(Assets) 0.468*** 0.680*** 0.117*** 0.395***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Closely-held shares -0.632** -0.243 -0.235* -0.402***
(0.015) (0.394) (0.076) (0.003)
Leverage 0.130** 0.152*** 0.046 0.116***
(0.014) (0.002) (0.113) (0.000)
Cash/Assets 0.329* 0.540*** 0.082 0.464***
(0.089) (0.004) (0.441) (0.000)
Op. CF/Assets -0.006 0.088 -0.005 0.076**
(0.928) (0.165) (0.901) (0.046)
Constant 0.949 4.841*** -0.903 2.591*** 3.346*** 0.354
(0.474) (0.000) (0.501) (0.000) (0.000) (0.492)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1,514 1,514 1,514 5,225 5,225 5,225
Adj. R-squared 0.098 0.157 0.208 0.037 0.138 0.171
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Table 8: Alternative measures of CSP – Principal Component Analysis 
This table presents results with our alternative CSP measure. Panel A reports the loadings for each IVA 
subcategories. In Panel B, we report results from panel regressions that are similar to Table 4. The 
dependent variable is IVA_PCA, the first principal component of all subcategories. In Panel C, we report 
results from country-median regressions that are similar to those in Table 5. The dependent variable is the 
median values of the first principal component across all firm-years for each country. All variables are defined 
in the Appendix. p-values based on standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, 
based on two-tailed tests.  
 
Panel A: Principal component loading for IVA subcategories 
Subcategories Loading 
Strategic Governance 0.4272 
Human Capital 0.3464 
Stakeholder Capital 0.4028 
Products and Services 0.3519 
Emerging Markets 0.2600 
Environmental Risk Factors 0.0081 
Environmental Management Capacity 0.4376 
Environmental Opportunity Factors 0.3904 
Eigenvalue 3.2667 
Proportion explained 0.4083 
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Panel B: Panel regressions 
 Dep. variable is the IVA_PCA 
(1) (2) (3) 
ROA 0.145*** 0.220*** 
(0.009) (0.000) 
M/B -0.004 0.021 
(0.770) (0.133) 
R&D expenses 13.989 13.138 
(0.198) (0.194) 
Ln(Assets) 0.357*** 0.816*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Closely-held shares -1.485*** -0.956*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.106** 0.165*** 
(0.027) (0.000) 
Cash/Assets 0.459*** 1.272*** 
(0.007) (0.000) 
Op. CF/Assets -0.061 0.138** 
(0.372) (0.031) 
ADR 1.459*** 0.831*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 9.695*** 11.758*** 5.573*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE No Yes Yes 
Observations 6,739 6,739 6,739 
Adj. R-squared 0.115 0.165 0.226 
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Panel C: Country-median regressions 
Independent variables are  Raw  Orthogonalized 
Coefficient Adj.  Coefficient Adj.  
Model Independent variable (p-value) R-squared  (p-value) R-squared 
(1) Ln(Income-per-capita) 1.150*** 0.424   
(0.000)   
(2) Absence of corruption 0.468*** 0.342 0.149 -0.016 
(0.000) (0.379) 
(3) Lack of civil liberties & political rights -0.804*** 0.396 -0.475** 0.064 
(0.000) (0.016) 
(4) Harmony 1.571* 0.063 0.673 -0.014 
(0.076) (0.344) 
(5) Egalitarianism 3.194*** 0.258 1.081 -0.010 
(0.001) (0.288) 
(6) Intellectual autonomy 2.903*** 0.351 1.360 0.014 
(0.000) (0.110) 
(7) Affective autonomy 3.262*** 0.556 2.406*** 0.169 
(0.000) (0.000) 
(8) Power distance index -0.048*** 0.349 -0.024* 0.023 
(0.000) (0.079) 
(9) Overall fit (include all indep. var.)      0.563    
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Figure 1: CSP and Income-per-capita
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